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FIFTH AMENDMENT-USE OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 99 S. Ct. 1667 (1979).
Last Term the Supreme Court in two decisions
clarified the availability of grand jury testimony
for use in subsequent criminal and civil proceed-
ings. In New Jersey v. Portasht the Court held that a
prosecutor could not use a person's immunized
grand jury testimony to impeach his credibility as
a testifying defendant at a later criminal trial. In
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest2 the Court
held that in order to obtain transcripts from a
previous federal grand jury proceeding, a plaintiff
in a civil antitrust action had to make a showing
that the necessity for disclosure was greater than
the need for grand jury secrecy, although the bur-
den to justify disclosure would vary as the need for
grand jury secrecy varied. The cases represented a
divergence in the protection of grand jury testi-
mony for use in later judicial actions. In Portash,
the Court refused to carve out an exception to the
rule that immunized testimony could not later be
utilized in a prosecution of the testifying person. In
contrast, the Court in Douglas Oil approved an
existing trend among lower federal courts to be
more amenable to requests to disclose transcripts
front completed grand jury proceedings for use in
civil antitrust actions. While Portash foreclosed a
potential weapon by the government in criminal
prosecutions, Douglas Oil added a weapon to the
arsenal of civil antitrust plaintiffs, one that may
prove to be an inducement to such litigation.
NEW JERSEY V. PORTASH
The criminal defendant in Poroash posed a con-
stitutional challenge to the use of his prior immu-
nized testimony for impeachment at trial. The fifth
amendment3 to the Constitution, as applied to the
$40 U.S. 450 (1979).
299 S. Cit. 1667 (1979).
11 ..No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
states through the fourteenth amendment," pro-
hibits a person from being "compelled ... to be a
witness against himself."5 However, this privilege
is not absolute. The Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of "immunity" statutes,6 which authorize
agreements wherein the government agrees not to
prosecute a witness, or use his testimony, in ex-
change for the witness relinquishing his privilege
not to testify against himself. Immunity statutes
fall into two categories. "Transactional" immunity
statutes bar the government from prosecuting an
individual for any transaction as to which he tes-
tified. 7 "Use and derivative use" statutes,s in con-
trast, permit the government to prosecute a witness,
but preclude using either the compelled testimony
or any information derived from it against the
witness at trial.9
The Court first considered the necessary scope
of immunity statutes in Counelman v. Hitchcock,'"
and concluded that the immunity provided was
insufficient because the statute permitted the use
at trial of evidence derived from the immunized
testimony. This abridged the constitutional privi-
case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
' In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
6Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).7 Ste. e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 106-1 (Smith-Hurd
1978): MINN. STAT. § 609.09 (1969); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2945.44 (Baldwin 1973).
8 Use and derivative use immunity is also referred to
as "'testimonial" or "use-plus-fruits" immunity.
'See, e.g.. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976); KAN. STAT.
§ 22-3112 (1974).
'u 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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lege, the Court reasoning that "legislation ... can-
not replace or supply ... [the privilege], at least
unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in
scope and effect.""
The rather broad language of Counselman and
later cases12 was generally assumed to have re-
quired a transactional immunity rule. This belief
was perpetuated until the Court ruled squarely on
the issue again in 1972, when it considered federal
legislation' 3 which adopted use and derivative use
immunity. The federal statute at issue prevented
the use of compelled testimony or information, or
any information directly or indirectly derived
therefrom, against a witness in any criminal trial. 4
In Kastigar v. United States 5 the Court held that the
statute was valid, adopting the standard that the
immunity granted must be coextensive with the
protection provided by the self-incrimination priv-
ilege.' 6 This outcome necessitated a narrower read-
ing of the self-incrimination privilege than that
suggested by Counselman:
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prose-
cuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against
being "forced to give testimony leading to the inflic-
tion of 'penalties affixed to ... criminal acts."' Im-
munity from the use of compelled testimony, as well
as evidence derived directly and indirectly there-
from, affords this protection. It prohibits the prose-
cutorial authorities from using the compelled testi-
mony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the
testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal
penalties on the witness.'7
It is against this background that New Jersey v.
Portash's came before the Court last Term. In 1974
Joseph Portash, mayor of Manchester Township in
New Jersey, was subpoenaed by a state grand jury.
After expressing his intention to claim his privilege
against self-incrimination, the prosecutors and Por-
tash's lawyers agreed that Portasti's testtmony be-
fore the grand jury and any evidence derived frorr
it could not be used in subsequent criminal pro-
" Id. at 585.
'&e Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949):
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
F 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976).
"Id. at § 6002.
"'406 U.S. 441 (1972).
"' Id. at 449, 453.
17 Id. at 453 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
In addition, the Court stated that the "broad language.
in Counselinan relied upon by the petitioner was unneces-
sary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered
binding authority." Id. at 454-55 (footnote omitted).18440 U.S. 450 (1979).
ceedings under New Jersey's use immunity stat-
ute."5 Portash testified, but no agreement to avoid
a criminal prosecution could be reached. In 1975
Portash was indicted for misconduct in office and
extortion by a public official. 20
Before trial, defense counsel requested a ruling
from the trial judge that no use of the immunized
grand jury testimony would be permitted for im-
peachment purposes.2 1 The judge refused, and de-
fense counsel renewed the request after completion
of the state's case.? Ultimately, the judge ruled
that if Portash testified and gave an answer on
direct or cross-examination which was materially
inconsistent with his grand jury testimony, the
prosecutor could use the testimony in his cross-
examination of Portash.2 Defense counsel advised
Portash not to testify, he did not, and a jury
convicted him on one of two counts.
2 4
The conviction was reversed by the New Jersey
Appellate Division.25 The court, employing the
reasoning found in Kastigar, noted that the grant
of immunity "must leave the witness whose testi-
mony has been compelled and the prosecutorial
authorities 'in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege. ' ' 26 Allowing the use of compelled testi-
mony to impeach a witness at a subsequent trial
did not meet this test, since the testimony would
not have existed had the defendant not been com-
pelled to speak.27
"9 At that time the statute read aus follows:
If any public emplojee testifies before any court,
grand jury or the State Commission of Investigation,
such testimony and the evidence derived therefrom
shall not be used against such public employee in a
subsequent criminal proceeding under the laws of
this State; provided that no such public employee
shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for
perjury committed while so testifying.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.2a2 (West 1976). In 1975
several additions were made to the phrasing of the statute,
requiring the employee to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination, requiring that the employee must be told
that failure to appear and testify will subject him to
removal from office, and adding false swearing to the
unexempted prosecution or punishment. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:81-17.2a2 (West Supp. 1979).
2' 440 U.S. at 451-52.
•2 Id. at 452.
r2 id.
2" Id. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Porlash, contested
this %,ersion of the facts. See text accompanying notes 44-
47 1nfra.
4 440 U.S. at 452.
2" 151 N.J. Super. 200, 376 A.2d 950 (1977).
26Id. at 205, 376 A.2d at 953 (qunting Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. at 462).
27 151 N.J. Super. at 205. 376 A.2d at 953.
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In addition, the court refused to accept the state's
argument that the impeachment should be allowed
by the reasoning of Harris v. New York2s and its
progeny, which involved admissability of Miranda-
violative confessions.29 The court noted that in
Harris the statement sought to be used for impeach-
ment purposes was voluntarily given, while Por-
tash's testimony was compelled under the immu-
nity statute30 The New Jersey Supreme Court
denied the state's petition for certification of an
appeal.3'
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by
Justice Stewart.3 2 First, the Court disposed of the
state's argument that since Portash never became
a witness and his grand jury testimony was never
used against him, the constitutional issue presented
was "abstract and hypothetical. ' 'an While Portash
had not testified, the Court noted that this did not
prevent the New Jersey appellate court from decid-
ing the merits of the federal constitutional issue.
34
Justice Stewart analogized the case to Brooks v.
Tennessee,s3 where the Court (and the Tennessee
court) had considered the validity of a state statute
requiring a defendant who desired to testify to be
his own first witness. In Brooks, the defendant had
not testified, but the Court found his constitutional
rights impinged since the statute penalized his fifth
amendment privilege to remain silent. Similarly,
Portash was not required to testify in order to raise
his constitutional claim.
36
On the merits, Justice Stewart quickly rejected
the state's arguments, in language and reasoning
that paralleled the opinion of the New Jersey ap-
pellate court. Briefly tracing the Court's consider-
ation of immunity statutes from Counselman to Kas-
tigar, Justice Stewart reiterated the language from
Kastigar which, while somewhat narrowing the pre-
28 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'See, e.g., Oregon v. I-lass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In
both Harris and Hass the Court allowed the prosecution
to utilize confessions from the defendants, voluntarily
given, that were violative of the requirements of Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as long as the evidence
was not used in the prosecution's "case in chief." Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
at 721. In both cases the prosecution used the incrimi-
nating statements for impeachment.
151 N.J. Super. at 206, 376 A.2d at 954.
a' 75 N.J. 597, 384 A.2d 827 (1978).
32 Justices Brennan and Powell submitted separate
concurring opinions, while Justice Blackmun, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, dissented.
:" 440 U.S. at 454.
3' Id. at 455.
"' 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
" 440 tJ S. at 456.
viously understood scope of the fifth amendment
privilege, stated that compelled testimony could
not be used "in any respect" in a subsequent pros-
ecution.3
7
Apparently of the view that the Kastigar lan-
guage was dispositive, the Court without pause
then considered if the exceptions found valid in
Harris and Oregon v. Hassss applied in this case.
Noting, as had the New Jersey court, that the
voluntary aspect of the Miranda-violative state-
ments in Harris and Hass were "central to the
decisions in those cases, ' ' 9 the Court refused to
balance the need to prevent perjury with the need
to deter unlawful police conduct, the test under
which the police had prevailed in Harris and Hass.
Since testimony given under a grant of immunity
"is the essence of coerced testimony... [blalancing
... is not simply unnecessary. It is imper-
missable.
40
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan,joined
by Justice Marshall, felt that there may have been
"adequate and independent state grounds" for the
result that the New Jersey courts reached, preclud-
ing Supreme Court review. He did, however, agree
with the Court's disposal of the federal constitu-
tional question.4'
3
7 Id. at 458 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. at 453)(emphasis in original). The same language
appears in the text accompanying note 17 supra. In
addition, the Court reiterated the prohibition against the
use at trial of involuntary statements from the accused
by citing a case from 1978: "But any criminal trial use
against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial
of due process of law." 440 U.S. at 459 (quoting Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978)) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
8420 U.S. 714 (1975).
3 440 U.S. at 459.
"'Id. In footnote nine, the Court stated that "'wle
express no view as to whether. possibly truthful immu-
nized testimony may be used in a subsequent false dec-
larations prosecution premised on an inconsistency be-
tween that testimony and later, nonimmunized, testi-
mony. That question will be presented in Dunn .Ouited
States, ... cert. granted, 439 U.S. 1045." 440 U.S. at 459
11.9.
Later in the Term the Court decided Dunn, finding it
unnecessary to reach the question presented in the Porlash
footnote. Dunn v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 2193
(1979). Dunn was convicted of lying before a grand jury
while giving immunized testimony, and the court of
appeals upheld the use of the grand jury testimony to
convict him, noting that the perjury was "another crime
not existing when the immunity was offered." 577 F.2d
119, 125 (10th Cir. 1978). However, it also noted that
Dunn had admitted that his immunized testimony was
false, and the court was doubtful that the testimony could
be used "without a prior showing of falsity." Id.
4 440 U.S. at 460 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., con-
[Vol. 70
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In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, expressed his agree-
ment with the Court's holding, emphasizing first,
on the procedural issue, that he preferred defend-
ants in such cases to take the stand, but that the
state court treated the issue as properly presented;
42
and second, on the merits, that the fifth amend-
ment privilege prevents a state from using com-
pulsion to extract information from a defendant,
regardless of whether that information is truthful
or false.
43
In a lengthy dissent addressing only the proce-
dural issue, Justice Blackmun reviewed the facts
and concluded that the Court was improperly
resolving an "abstract dispute" that was not at
issue before the trial judge." He characterized the
state's argument as not that the federal constitu-
tional issue was improperly presented, but that
there was no federal issue at all,45 asserting that the
infringement of Portash's right to testify was merely
"speculative."4 6 Upon examining the record.
Blackmun argued that Portash's counsel was not
concerned that the state would use the immunized
testimony to impeach his client; rather, he was
concerned with the state relying on the immunized
testimony in formulating cross-examination ques-
tions for his client. Blackmun concluded that this
issue was the proper one for decision, not the issue
of impeachment that was addressed by the state
court and the Supreme Court
7
One commentator, while agreeing with the result
of the state court in Portash, scored that court for
its "mechanical application of the Kasligar doc-
trine"48 in resolving the case. Given the brevity of
the Supreme Court's opinion, the same charge
could be leveled at it. The broad language in
Kasligar, which the reviewing courts relied on, must
be read in light of the Harris line of cases. On an
initial reading, the state's reliance on Harris was
curring). Justice Brennan cited several New Jersey Su-
preme Court opinions which impose stricter standards on
self-incrimination issues than that required by the federal
constitution. However, the New Jersey appellate court
cited none of these cases and relied, with one exception,
entirely on federal case law. See also the Court's opinion,
440 U.S. at 453 n.3.
42 Id. at 462 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
43 Id. at 463.
4Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 465.
46 Id. at 467.47 Id. at 469-71.
"Comment, State v. Portash-Threatening nipeacnment
and Influencing Defendants' Decision to Testify: Prohibited Uses
of Compelled Testimony, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 815,827 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
not a futile gesture, since the Harris Court distin-
guished between affirmative use of evidence ob-
tained in violation of Miranda and impeachment
use of such evidence. The latter was permissible,
the Harris Court stated, because the privilege to
remain silent or testify "cannot be construed to
include the right to commit perjury."4 9 The Court
in Harris also pointed out that the statements were
trustworthy and were only barred from use in the
prosecution's case in chief.5 In addition, numerous
commentators'i had predicted that the Harris rea-
soning would allow prosecutors to use immunized
testimony for impeachment purposes-the precise
situation addressed in Portash.
However, the Court's distinguishing of Hanis is
the better view, since the logical interpretation is
that Harris turned on the reasoning that violating
Miranda did not necessarily violate the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege. A balancing test was
not applicable in Portash, since the fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege is absolute and not
qualified. As long as the statements are voluntary,
as in Harris, the fifth amendment privilege does not
come into play, since it only prohibits use of com-
pelled statements. However, if the statements are
compelled in any manner, as in Porlash, then the
privilege becomes an absolute.
Some possible exceptions to Portash are indirectly
raised by Justice Blackmun's dissent. Blackmun
felt that the use of the immunized testimony for
cross-examination, not impeachment, purposes was
the proper issue for review. However, given the,
reasoning of the majority, it is likely that either
reading of the facts would have required reversal
of the trial judge's decision. Use of the testimony
to prepare questions for cross-examination is but
another derivative use of the testimony forbidden
by Kastigar.52 Indeed, following Portash, it is likely
that the Court would prohibit the prosecution from
using the compelled testimony in any way to re-
place the investigative and analytical processes
involved in the preparation and presentation of a
criminal trial.
In addition, at least two more possible exceptions
49401 U.S. at 225.50Id. at 224.
"I See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE LJ. 1198, 1223 (1971); Ritchie,
Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment. The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REv. 383, 415 (1977);
Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony:
Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REv.
470, 485 (1972).
52 406 U.S. at 453.
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are suggested by the Court's opinion: whether the
immunized grand jury testimony could be used in
a trial following an indictment for perjury com-
mitted at a trial following the grand jury testimony
,or whether the testimony could be used in a trial
for perjury committed while giving the testimony
before the grand jury. In both examples affirmative
answers are doubtful since, following the Kastigar
rule, the testimony would not have existed but for
the grant of immunity. However, the counterar-
gument would run that the grant of immunity
covers only the subject matter of incriminating
statements in the testimony, and does not immu-
nize crimes (e.g., perjury) committed after or during
the delivery of the immunized testimony.s
In light of Kastigar, Portash should not be consid-
ered a great doctrinal leap forward by the Court,
but rather a logical extension of precedent. The
Court seemed to be willing, as Justice Blackmun
charged, to stretch the article III "case or contro-
versy" requirement to close off an extension of
Harris suggested by a number of commentators.5
The opposite decision would have allowed prose-
cutors to obtain testimony under a grant of use
immunity and then briig a prosecution, safe in the
knowledge that the defendant could not contradict
previous testimony without opening himself to its
use in evidence. The result would have been a
formidable end-run around the traditional confines
of the use and derivative use rule.
DouaAs OIL Co. V. PETROL SToPs NoRTHWEST
In contrast to the result in Portash, the Court in
Douglas Oilss proved to be much more willing, in
the civil context, to approve the use of grand jury
materials in later judicial proceedings. While the
tradition of grand jury secrecy has remained an
integral part of the criminal justice system," the
Court has been willing to sanction the disclosure of
grand jury testimony (in transcript form) for later
use when "the ends of justice require it." 5 This
5 The issue of the use of immunized grand jury testi-
mony in a prosecution for grand jury perjury is addressed
in note 40 supra.
'uIndeed, Justice Blackmun characterized the issue the
Court decided as an "abstract and academic legal ques-
tion." 440 U.S. at 468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis addedl
: u S. Ct. 1661 (1979).
56 Id. at 1672 n.9.
57 Id. at 1673 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum, 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940)). While the courts gener-
ally speak of transcripts, on occasion other grand jury
material is involved and may be sought in discovery by
civil plaintiffs. See, e.g., United States v. Armco Steel
tendency is especially apparent when the grand
jury has been dismissed, and the various policy
reasons in favor of secrecys are not present in full
force.
Prior to Douglas Oil, the Supreme Court on three
occasions considered the issue of releasing tran-
scripts of completed grand jury proceedings. The
first two cases involved antitrust suits brought by
the government; in both cases, the defendant com-
panies sought the transcripts to aid in preparing
for their defense. In United States v. Procter &Gambles9
the company sought the transcripts under Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 The
majority held that there must be "a compelling
need" to break the secrecy of the grand jury, since
the relevancy or usefulness of the transcripts were
not sufficient to establish "good cause" 61 under
Rule 34. As examples of "particularized need" to
lift grand jury secrecy, the Court listed the use of
a transcript at trial to impeach a witness, refresh
his memory, or test his credibility.62 In Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United Statese6 the Court adopted
the "particularized need" test of Procter & Gamble
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Mo. 1978), where De-
partment of Justice interview memoranda used before a
grand jur," were sought in civil discovery.
58 The Court has stated and summarized different
rationale for --rand jury secrecy. One summary that the
Court and lower courts have frequently quoted is found
in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment
may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost
freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to
prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with
the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury
and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to
the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from
the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt.
'Quoted with approval in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops
Northwest, 99 S. Ct. at 1673 n.10).
5 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
o FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
356 U.S. at 682. An amendment in 1970 eliminated
the requirement of "good cause" from Rule 34. This
change, however, does not diminish the force of reasoning
from Procter & Gamble, since that decision properly relied
more on policy reasons for safeguarding the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings, rather than on an elaboration of
the meaning of "good cause."
62 Id. at 683.
63360 U.S. 395 (1959).
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to evaluate a transcript request under Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.CA
In the third case, Dennis v. United States,es the
Court in a somewhat different context retained the
"particularized need" principle but arguably mod-
ified the meaning of that term. There, it was held
that a district court should have granted a Rule
6(e) request by a criminal defendant to have the
grand jury testimony of four government witnesses
released. The Court, after approving the trend
toward greater criminal discovery, 66 stated that the
"particularized need" test had been met since the
testimony had been given years earlier and for
several reasons was suspect and since the govern-
ment conceded that the necessity for continued
grand jury secrecy was minimal.' The Court con-
cluded that this showing went "substantially be-
yond the minimum required by Rule 6(e) and the
prior decisions of this Court."68 This language sug-
gested a flexible standard with only a "minimum"
showing of need required beyond a request for
general discovery.
Numerous lower federal courts attempted to ap-
ply the standards of these three cases in considering
requests for the release of grand jury material for
use in private antitrust litigation.es One trend,
notably present in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,70 emphasized that a breakdown in
the need for secrecy did not lower the standard of
necessity that a civil party must show in order to
secure release of transcripts.
The more recent and prevalent trend, often re-
lying on the more lenient language of Dennis,71 was
to downplay the need for secrecy and decrease the
required showing that parties seeking disclosure
must demonstrate. In one leading decision, U.S.
Industries v. United States District Court,72 the court
6' Rule 6(e) provides for the disclosure of grand jury
transcripts "when so directed by a court preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6()(2)(C)(i).
65 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
66 Id. at 870.
67 Id. at 871-74.
raId. at 871-72 (footnote omitted).
'9 See generally Comment, Disclosure of Federal GrandJuy
Material, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 399, 406-10 (1977); Com-
ment, Texas v. United States Steel Corp. and Illinois v. Sar-
baugh: The Disclosure and Use of Grand Jury Transcripts in
Private Antitrust Litigation, 9 Lov. CM. L.J. 984 (1978).
70 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
71 But see I C. WRIoHT, FEDERAL PRAcriE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 109, at 185 (1969), finding Procter & Gamble to
be controlling in civil suits since Dennis "rests on the
special need for fair play to criminal defendants."
72 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965).
stated that if the reasons for maintaining secrecy
applied to a lesser degree, than a "large compelling
need" was not required to be shown.73 Disclosure
was granted, since only the policy of protecting
future grand jury witnesses was relevant, and that
interest could be protected by the deletion of ref-
erences to the witnesses' names 
74
Two more recent lower court decisions exempli-
fied the divergence in standards of review. In Texas
v. United States Steel Corp.,75 the corporation, in a
completed criminal action, had obtained tran-
scripts of grand jury testimony of its own employees
pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 76 In a civil antitrust action,
the state of Texas, under Rule 34, attempted to
discover the material from the corporation. How-
ever, the court of appeals upheld a denial of that
request, reasoning that grand jury secrecy had not
been breached by the prior release to the corpora-
tion since a corporation acquiring testimony of its
own spokesmen was similar to an individual de-
fendant acquiring his own transcript; the mere fact
that the opposing party had transcripts did not
establish a particularized need for Texas
77
In contrast, the court of appeals in Illinois v.
Sarbaugh,78 on a similar fact pattern to that in United
States Steel, noted that the particularized need stan-
dard had "'been eroded to some extent' ... by
language in Dennis... if not by decisions of lower
federal courts led by U.S. Industries v. United States
District Court... ."79 Since the corporate parties had
already obtained their employee's testimony, only
a residual reason for grand jury secrecy remained,
which could be covered by a protective orders
°
The court found the standard met if the corporate
employer of the grand jury witness whose transcript
was sought already had a copy of that transcript,
,nd the witness was scheduled to be deposed or to
give testimony at trial.81
73 345 F.2d at 21.
74 1d. at 22.
75 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889
(1977).
76 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
77 546 F.2d at 630-31.
78 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889
(1977).
7 552 F.2d at 774 (citations omitted).
o Id. at 777. The protective order required the attorney
of the requesting party to keep a log of to whom and
when the transcript was shown, prohibited copying it,
and required that it be returned when no longer needed
for the prescribed use. Id.
81 Id. The court also criticized the analogy made by the
United States Steel court between a corporation obtaining
testimony by its own employees and an individual ob-
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Thus, the Douglas Oil litigation was conducted
in light of a growing body of precedent favoring
disclosure of grand jury testimony in civil cases.
Procter & Gamble and Pittsburgh Plate Glass had
stressed the requirement of particularized need,
regardless of the need for grand jury secrecy. But
Dennis and its progeny in lower courts stressed a
balancing test: the need for grand jury secrecy
against the need for transcript disclosure. More-
over, the first prong of the test was given a variable
measure. As the need for grand jury secrecy became
less weighty (particularly when the grand jury was
discharged and the civil defendant had already
obtained the transcripts), the corresponding need
for the transcripts became less compelling. How-
ever, the minimum need had to go beyond a
request for general discovery-some showing had
to be made that the party would have a need for
the testimony at trial.
The fact pattern in Douglas Oil is essentially
similar to the cases noted above. In 1973, Petrol
Stops Northwest, a gasoline retailer with operations
in California, Arizona, and other states, filed an
antitrust suit in the district court in Arizona, prem-
ised on the Sherman Act a2 against Douglas Oil
Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, and ten
other oil companies. Two other retailers from Ari-
zona filed a similar antitrust action in the district
court in Arizona against nine oil companies, in-
cluding Phillips Petroleum.8 Meanwhile, a federal
grand jury empaneled in California, which was
investigating the pricing behavior of the compa-
nies, called several of the oil company employees
to testify.84 This grand jury returned an indictment
charging price-fixing against the oil companies; the
companies obtained the transcripts of their em-
ployees' testimony, pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(A),
but eventually pleaded nolo contendere to the
charges!s5 In 1976 the retailers petitioned the dis-
trict court which had supervised the grand jury to
release the transcripts; the district court granted
the request, subject to several protective condi-
tions.
.aining his own transcript. In the former case, the Sarbaugh
court reasoned, the need for grand jury secrecy actually
decreased, since disclosure was made to the most likely
source of retaliation to the witness-the corporation that
employs him. Id. at 778.
s2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
a99 S. Ct. at 1670.Id. at 16 71.
Id.
a Id. at 1671-72. The protective order limited disclo-
sure to Petrol Stops' attorneys, prohibited copying, re-
quired return when the transcripts were no longer needed,
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting
that "only a minimal showing of particularized
need" was required in this situation, citing U.S.
Industries and Sarbaugh in support.87 The retailers
pointed out that the requested material could be
used for impeachment at trial, since the oil com-
panies' nolo contendere pleas suggested that the ma-
terials would support the government's (and the
retailer's) position.ss The court of appeals also aD-
proved the district court in California, the location
of the grand jury proceedings, as the proper court
to consider releasing the material, rather than the
district court in Arizona, where the civil suits were
taking place.s
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme
Court affirmed as to the standard of review, but
reversed and remanded on the question of which
district court was the proper one to implement the
standard of review.' On the first issue, the Court
discussed the Procter & Gamble and Dennis decisions
and proceeded to outline the standard which
"emerge[d]"'9 1 from those cases: that parties seeking
disclosure under Rule 6(e) must show that possible
injustice in another proceeding needs to be
avoided, that the need for disclosure is greater than
the need for continued secrecy, and that the request
is narrowly drawn to cover only material so
needed.92
After noting that the interest to protect the
identity of witnesses before future grand juries
reduced but did not eliminate the need fo- se-
crecy,' the Court gave its approval to the lower
court trend outlined above. As secrecy considera-
tions "become less relevant, a party asserting a
need for grand jury transcripts will have a lesser
burden in showingjustification." a Thus, the Court
and limited the use of the evidence to impeachment,
refreshing recollection, and testing credibility. Id. at 1672.
17571 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978).
88id. at 1131.
89 Id. at 1130 n.4.
9°99 S. Ct. at 1667.
9' Id. at 1674.
92 Id. While this language somewhat reformulated the
notion of "particularized need," the Court in a footnote
reiterated the examples from Procter & Gamble as a "typ-
ical showing" of particularized need. Id. at 1674 n.12.
The examples are stated in the text accompanying note
62 supra.
93 99 S. Ct. at 1674-75. "1he Court noted that in the
instant and similar cases protective conditions on the use
of disclosed material may be appropriate. Id. at 1675.
Such conditions could provide for the deletion of names
ofwitnesses, so witnesses before future grand juries would
not be deterred from testifying.
9 Id. at 1675. Significantly, the Court cited the Sar-
bough and U.S. Industries decisions in support, but not
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firmly established a flexible standard (stressing
protective conditions covering disclosure, where
appropriate) for release of grand jury transcripts to
civil plaintiffs. If prior disclosure had been made
and the transcripts would be used for impeachment
or refreshing memory at deposition or trial, then
the need for disclosure overcomes the need to pro-
tect the residual reasons for grand jury secrecy.
It is interesting that the Court apparently felt
that the jurisdictional issue was as important as the
standard of review issue.95 After an extended dis-
cussion of the handling of the distribution of grand
jury materials in civil antitrust proceedings, the
Court concluded that requests for disclosure should
generally be directed at the district court that
supervised the grand jury,96 but that in the instant
case the district court in Arizona was in the best
position to determine the status of the civil suit
where the desired transcripts were to be used. On
remand, the Court directed the district court in
California to determine the need for secrecy, and
then send that information and the requested ma-
terials to the Arizona court supervising the civil
cases,. which was in the best position to evaluate
the need for disclosure.a
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Stewart, disagreed solely
with the Court's disposal of the jurisdictional issue.
He argued that the district court judge in Califor-
nia had not abused his discretion, and found "trou-
bling" the Court's willingness to review the deci-
sions of the trial judge29
United States Steel or City of Philadelphia. Id. In a footnote,
the Court stated that the "minimal showing" language
of the court of appeals was not erroneous in the context
of the "circumstances of this case." Id. at 1675 n.14. The
Court came to this conclusion since it read the court of
appeals decision as properly applying the standard of
proof required by Procter & Gamble and Dennis. Id.
' The Court referred to the jurisdictional issue as an
"important" question, id. at 1676, and felt that on the
question lower courts needed "guidance in cases of this
kind." Id. at 1678 n.18.
96Id. at 1676.
97 Id. at 1678.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 1682 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens felt that Dennis,
which involved criminal defendants, involved policy con-
siderations not relevant here, and did not support the
Court's exercise of discretion. Id. at 1682 n.9. Accord,
WRicHT, note 71 supra.
Justice Rehnquist submitted a brief concurring opin-
ion, questioning whether the Court had jurisdiction to
review the order of the district court. He concluded that
the order was appealable as a "final decision" under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and the Supreme Court could exercise its
Justice Stevens' dissent raises the question of
whether the Court established a per se rule for
determining which federal district court should
supervise the release of grand jury transcripts, or
whether it made the determination de novo on the
facts in Douglas Oil. Stevens apparently adopted
the latter view, since he reviewed the record and
concluded that the district judge in California had
sufficiently consulted with his colleagues in Ari-
zona, indicating that he had not abused his discre-
tion.1° However, the majority opinion in several
places' 0 ' made reference to the rule resolving all
cases of this kind in the district courts. In addition,
the majority opinion appears to grant courts of
appeal greater leeway in evaluating the exercise of
discretion by the district courts in these cases."
On the merits, the Court's opinion should not
alert lower courts to follow a new standard. While
the Court adopted the more lenient approach to
the release of grandjury transcripts, caution should
be observed in examiningJustice Powell's tripartite
breakdown of the standard determining release.
Each element of the standard, as the Court cor-
rectly observed,1 s was present to some extent in
both Procter & Gamble and Dennis. In addition, the
significance of the first prong of the standard-
that a possible injustice in another judicial pro-
ceeding needs to be avoided-was lessened when
the Court, later in the opinion, 1 4 reiterated the
standard without explicitly restating the phrase. In
2ffect, the Court was including the first part of the
standard under the general term "need for disclo-
sure." Moreover, the adoption of an explicit bal-
ancing test'05 significantly clarifies the second
prong of the three-part standard-that the need
for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy-and follows the results of the majority of
the lower court decisions. Finally, the Court in
developing the third prong of the standard-that
the request must cover only material that is
certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. 99 S. Ct.
at 1680 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Io Id. at 1680-82 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also chastised
the Court for second guessing the review of the facts
made by the district court and the court of appeals. Id. at
1680 n.l.
o' 99 S. Ct. at 1678, 1679.
102 The Court stated that "[wie have a duty, however,
to guide the exercise of discretion by district courts, and
when necessary to overturn discretionary decisions under
Rule 6(e)." Id. at 1678.
'03 Id. at 1674.
"'
4 Id. at 1675.
1Iid.
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needed-simply restated the fact that plaintiffs
cannot gain wholesale discovery of grand jury ma-
terial even when they establish a need for disclo-
sure.
It is doubtful that the antitrust bar will unani-
mously approve of Douglas Oil. At least one prac-
titioner, in criticizing the leniency of Sarbaugh (and,
by extension, Douglas Oil) suggested that criminal
antitrust defendants will forego obtaining tran-
scripts under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) to avoid having the




Such prior disclosure would lessen the need for
secrecy and lessen the required showing of need for
the grand jury material. In addition, despite the
oil companies' nolo contendere pleas in the criminal
action, the Court reiterated that the only remain-
in reason for secrecy wat the need to protect
witnesses belore luture grand juries. '"' The Court
thus deemphasized one of the classic reasons for
secrecy-the protection of the innocent accused.
Nor does the Court's jurisdictional ruling seem to
modify the substance of the standard of review.
The misgivings of the antitrust defense bar seem
well founded. However, practitioners representing
civil antitrust plaintiffs will likely applaud Douglas
Oil for its liberalizing of discovery standards and
for its potential for speeding traditionally lengthy
and complex antitrust litigation.'
0 8
'06 Unikel, Discovejy of Grand jury Transcripts in Civil
Antitrust Cases in the Seventh Circuit: Fair Use or Abuse?, 66
ILL. B.J. 706, 710 (1978).
107 99 S. Ct. at 1674-75.
i08 Shortly before the decision in Douglas Oil, the trend
CONCLUSION
Porlash and Douglas Oil produced no great doc-
trinal shifts, but each had important practical
consequences. Portash refused to extend the Harris
line of cases to sanction an exemption to the rule
prohibiting the use of immunized testimony that
threatened to weaken that rule. A witness' immu-
nized testimony, at least for impeachment pur-
poses, falls under the "use and derivative use"
prohibition. Douglas Oil confirmed an existing
trend increasing the use of grand jury material in
private antitrust litigation. Given the fact that
private antitrust actions are an integral part of the
antitrust enforcement scheme and that private ac-
tions are often filed on the heels of federal investi-
gations of antitrust violations, Douglas Oil will un-
doubtedly encourage the proliferation, and per-
haps the success, of such suits.
0 9
among lower courts toward greater discovery of grand
jury material in civil antitrust litigation was favorably
summarized by the Report of the National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedure, re-
printed in 80 F.R.D. 509, 552 (1979). Specifically, this
report approved the result of the decisions in U.S. Indus-
tnes, Sarbaugh, and the court of appeals decision in Douglas
Oil. Id. at 552, nn. 44 & 45.
109 This prediction is supported oy the tact that grand
juries are playing an increasing role in federal antitrust
;nvestigation. In 1978 it was reported that over 100 such
grand jury investigations were pending. Baker, To Indict
or Not To Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act En-
forcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405,413 (1978). Therefore,
more grand jury material will potentially be available to
private antitrust plaintiffs.
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